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Abstract In this paper we aim to investigate the behaviour of returns around corporate news 
announcements. The motivation of the paper is that neither the broad classification of news into 
“good” and “bad” in many previous studies, nor the focus on only one news announcement type 
such as earnings announcements, allows us to determine whether returns patterns are in general 
consistent with efficient markets explanations or behavioural finance models. We study a unique 
dataset of more than 8,000 news announcements collected for 100 UK companies over a period of 
10 years. We compute both daily and cumulative abnormal returns over a 27 day event window to 
enable the observation not only of event day returns reactions but also pre- and post-event day 
returns. The results reveal that corporate events convey important economic information to 
investors. One interesting implication of this is an aggregated holistic approach towards firm 
events may not be appropriate. Some of the evidence found in this paper is not consistent with the 
efficient market expectations. Asymmetric reaction, sluggishness, over and under-reaction, and 
leakage are found in many types of news announcements.  
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This paper investigates the behaviour of returns around news announcements for 
UK quoted companies. More specifically we test the hypothesis that, on average, 
company news announcements have no impact on the behaviour of stock returns 
using an event study approach. There is surprisingly little consideration in the 
existing literature of the topic of very short term returns reaction to corporate 
news announcements. Because the vast majority of empirical research focuses on 
the long run behaviour of price reaction, many questions on short term reaction 
remain largely unanswered.  Some of these include the institutional economics of 
key agents responding to the release of new company information; whether 
asymmetric trading responses to “good” and “bad” news exist; whether investors 
discriminate between the different types of news; and whether there are post-event 
continuations or reversals. 
   The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that stock prices fully reflect all 
publicly available information, and that no information or analysis can provide 
investors with the opportunity to outperform the market. As a result, any news 
announcement concerning a company is rapidly subsumed within its stock price, 
and announcements will on average not affect stock prices beyond a very short 
period of time. The EMH holds that individual agents act rationally and therefore 
correctly interpret all available information, and so we should not observe a series 
of abnormal returns following the publication of company news. However, if we 
were to observe a returns drift and/or a reversal pattern after a news 
announcement then proponents of the EMH explain these regularities away as 
nothing more than random disturbances from efficient prices. An alternative 
explanation is provided by proponents of behavioural finance, who instead point 
to the presence of systematic deviations of returns from expected prices. Are 
3 
investors therefore rational as EMH predicts, or are they driven by heuristic bias? 
Here again, most of the empirical work has been undertaken on long run patterns. 
While it is interesting to assess asset price behaviour in the long run, the short 
term behaviour is no less important. If anything, market efficiency is about 
instantaneous adjustment of prices to new and random information. So, by simple 
aggregation argument, if there is exactly zero abnormal effect in the short term, 
there will be exactly zero abnormal effect in any longer term. True, there is a 
possibility that short term abnormal effects are too small to be detected 
statistically. But this limitation should drive research towards improving statistical 
methodologies rather than dropping the more interesting short term in favour of 
the long term. This is exactly the approach we adopt. We use a more appropriate 
econometric methodology that provides a more accurate inference. We are able, 
therefore, to study a relatively short event window which includes pre-event and 
post-event days. Arguably, given the frequent release of company, industry and 
country-specific news, a long event window will be increasingly susceptible to 
news events other than those included in the sample. Overlapping of news 
announcement may also be problematic in long even windows. The relatively 
short 27 day window should therefore mitigate these effects. The inclusion of pre-
event and post-event returns in the event window enables potential information 
leakage prior to news events as well as possible post-event drift.  
   We use a unique data set which spans a 10 year period for 100 UK quoted 
companies. For the 10 year period, every single news item on these companies 
was collected on a daily basis. These company news announcements were then 
classified into 30 different types. This approach has two advantages. First, it 
enables a detailed examination of each news type rather than a more simplistic 
aggregate study of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news. For example, Äijö (2008) classifies 
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macroeconomic announcements into positive and negative and is therefore only 
able to assess the unconditional effect of information. Our approach allows for 
more specific conditioning, and we are therefore able to discriminate between 
various types of news within the same group of, say, positive news. Second, most 
studies focus only on one or a few types of news. For example, Ryan and Taffler 
(2006) look at the impact of analyst forecast revisions, Donnelly (2008) 
investigates the impact of negative press comments, and Otchere and Ross (2002) 
study the buyback announcement effect. This seems to be driven both by the need 
to increase the number of test firms, the ease of data collection, and the low cost 
of obtaining such data. The problem with these approaches is that the conclusions 
are dependent on the specific type of news studied. Conclusions emanating from 
such studies are hardly generaliseable to the whole information set. Our approach, 
however, enables us to look into the whole set of available information. We are 
able to look both at the aggregate and disaggregate behaviour of all types of news. 
In particular, we are able to test Fama’s (1998) argument that over and under-
reaction findings are consistent with efficient markets. Since under-reaction 
findings are as common as over-reaction findings, these so called anomalies are 
simply “chance results” (p.304). 
   Previous tests have encountered intrinsic difficulty in addressing this argument. 
The reason is simple: you cannot formally test different and unrelated samples. 
Our data, on the other hand, enable testing across all available news types because 
they are from the same sample.  
   One important feature of this study is that reaction to news is considered at the 
firm level. Analysing the reaction of an aggregate index misses crucial firm level 
behaviour. Studies like Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) do offer some insight into 
the market reaction to a collection of news items, but they are only applicable to 
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the index and may therefore be hard to replicate when a profitable anomaly is 
found. For example, one might find no over-reaction in the index, but that could 
be due to half the stocks under-reacting while the other half are over-reacting, 
thereby cancelling the effect of the first half. If such an effect exists, say because 
of an industry or size effect, there would indeed be profitable strategies that would 
short the over-reacting stocks and long the under-reacting stocks. An index based 
analysis would miss such an opportunity. 
   The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The event study approach is 
explained in Section 2. Section 3 briefly outlines the data collection and the 
econometric methodology. The fourth section provides a detailed discussion of 
the results on each type of news, which are grouped into six categories for 
convenience. The last section discusses the implications of the results for market 
efficiency and concludes. 
2 The event study approach 
To test the central hypothesis of this paper, that, on average, company news 
announcements have no abnormal impact on the behaviour of stock returns, we 
employ an event study approach with a 27 day event window. We study the 
behaviour of estimated regression residuals for daily abnormal returns (ARs) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 25 trading days. Consistent with Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), ARs are daily average returns deviations of 
securities with news announcements from their normal relationship with the 
market, whereas CARs are the cumulative average returns effects of an 
announcement.  
   In this study, time is measured in terms of the number of trading days. The 27 
trading day window consists of five trading days before the event, two days for 
the event ‘day’, and 20 days thereafter. The event day for a given news 
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announcement is defined as day zero (t=0). Note that the time subscript refers to 
event-time rather than calendar-time. Importantly, the event date includes both the 
announcement day and the day after. This is to address the fact that 
announcements are sometimes issued after trading hours or towards the end of a 
trading day. In addition to the 27 day event window, we use a further 50 day pre-
event period to estimate the model. This gives a total of 76 day-observations for 
each estimation. Specifically, for an announcement that is made at time t, the 
estimation window will be t-55 to t+21, while abnormal returns will be estimated 
for t-5 to t+21.  
   We group our 30 news announcement types into six categories: profit 
announcements; corporate restructuring; market sentiment; growth and 
investment; dividends and financing; and miscellaneous news. Whilst any 
grouping will necessarily be imperfect, the categories chosen provide for a 
discussion of news types which demonstrates some commonality of both nature 
and effect. Testing the no-abnormal return hypothesis across a selection of 
different corporate announcements helps determine whether there is a common 
behavioural explanation for the anomalous return pattern following the news 
(Kadiyala and Rau, 2004).  
   The result tables are presented in a common three column format for each news 
type: the first shows the average abnormal return (AAR) for a given day; the 
second gives the t-statistic for that particular AAR; and the third gives the average 
cumulative abnormal return (ACAR), the t-statistics for which are presented at the 
bottom of each table. 
   One difficulty with presenting a study of this nature is the large number of t-
tests required: 28 tests for each of the 30 news types. Further, given the number of 
tests, the study is susceptible to data mining biases. We know, for example, that at 
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the 5% level, one in 20 tests might be significant by chance alone, even when a 
test is well specified. To counter this limitation, we take two actions: firstly, we 
employ only conservative levels of significance, that is, the 5% and 1% levels; 
secondly, we consider incidences of only one significant result in 20 (at the 5% 
level) to be the result of data mining, and thereby interpret our results accordingly. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Event study approach 
Because we are collecting a large number of announcements, resource limitation 
dictated that we restrict our sample of firms to 100. These firms were selected as 
follows. The list of all companies that traded in the London Stock Exchange 
between 1992 and 2002 was divided into three size groups. We then randomly 
drew 33 companies from the large size group, 33 from the medium size group and 
34 from the small size group. The firms were then tracked for every news item 
that was disclosed via Bloomberg between July 1992 and December 2002. This 
gave a total of 8,155 news announcements. These were then categorised into 30 
different types of announcement. 
   While there is a variety of techniques with which one can estimate abnormal 
returns, in this paper we adopt the dummy variable approach proposed by 
Thompson (1985) and Salinger (1992). The model for risk adjustment is the 
standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). We use the market model to 
obtain abnormal returns.  
 it ft i i mt ft itR r R r             (1) 
where ftit rR  is the actual return on asset i in excess of risk-free rate at time t , i  
is the intercept or a constant of the regression line, i is the market beta coefficient 
for security i , assumed stationary conditional on the risk-free return, ftmt rR   is 
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the market return in excess of the risk-free rate at time t , and it  is a zero mean, 
independent, disturbance term in period t  for security i . 
   Abnormal returns are obtained as  ˆ( )it it ft i mt ftAR R r R r     where the beta 
is estimated from the market model (1). One possible concern in using the market 
model for small firms is the non-trading bias. Clare et al. (2002), for example, 
found that non-trading in the London Stock Exchange is substantial (see also 
Foerster and Keim (1993) for evidence on US market). However, while non-
trading bias is real, it only impacts the estimation of systematic risk. It is therefore 
a major concern for those directly interested in estimating the slope but not the 
intercept. One common solution to this problem is to calculate abnormal returns 
as a simple difference between a stock’s return and the market return. Another 
solution is to ignore the market return altogether and use stock returns as 
abnormal returns. However, both of these solutions would entail the assumption 
that all stocks have a beta of either one or zero. This is likely to be unrealistic. 
Furthermore, by imposing either constraints (i.e. unit or zero beta), the intercept 
will generally be biased. It will only be unbiased and efficient if one of these 
constraints is true. On the other hand, it is well known in econometrics that adding 
an irrelevant variable would lead to an unbiased though inefficient intercept. As 
our concern is the intercept rather than the slope, a market model is a preferred 
option as it is more likely to lead to unbiased abnormal returns than a zero or unit 
beta based abnormal return. Moreover, it is often argued that short term returns 
are likely to have an expected value of zero (Fama, 1998). In such a case, the 
model used to compute abnormal returns becomes irrelevant. In fact, Campbell, 
Lo and Mackinlay (1997, pp.154-156) contend that there is little difference 
between using a zero beta model, a market model or a multifactor model. 
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   The standard procedure in event studies is to first compute abnormal returns, 
itAR , using an assumed model for normal returns. Then, in the second pass, 
abnormal returns are averaged or cumulated and tested. However, this method 
may yield spurious results (Salinger, 1992). Instead, we adopt a dummy variable 
approach. 
   The primary advantage of the dummy variable approach is that both prediction 
errors and test statistics are conveniently obtained from any standard regression 
package. Moreover, Salinger shows that the standard errors obtained from 
averaging individually estimated abnormal returns are incorrect. The reason is that 
such an approach ignores the intertemporal correlation of individually estimated 
abnormal returns. The two step approach also ignores the contemporaneous 
correlation of estimated cumulative abnormal returns.  
   The dummy approach, however, provides correct standard errors. Unlike the 
two-step procedures, the dummy approach estimates both the model and abnormal 
returns in a single step. Thus, not only do we obtain the correct standard error for 
each individual abnormal return, but we also obtain the correct estimate of the 
covariance between successive abnormal returns. This is crucial in obtaining the 
correct standard error of the average cumulative abnormal return. 
   The dummy model is simply obtained by appending a vector of dummy 
variables to the right-hand side of the conventional equilibrium model given in 
equation (1). Thus, for each news announcement, i, abnormal returns are 





it ft i i mt ft i i t itR r R r D 

   

           (2) 
where  i  is the abnormal return for period  , and tiD ,,  is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 for period   and zero otherwise. For example, tiD ,1,  equals 
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1 five days before the news announcement, tiD ,6,  equals 1 on the first event day, 
and tiD ,27,  equals 1 on the 20
th
  day of the post-event window. In this way, 
abnormal returns are distinguished from the residuals and contain the correct 
standard errors. Because the event window consists of two event days, the 
abnormal returns on the day of announcement and the following day ( 7,6 ) are 
then averaged to get a single value for event day abnormal returns. This reduces 
the number of event ‘days’ to 26. 
3.2 Testing abnormal returns 
Suppose there are N news items for each announcement category. Then, 26×N 
abnormal returns (  iˆ , Ni ,,1  ; 26,,1 ) are obtained. A given abnormal 
return,  iˆ , has variance 
2ˆ
 i . Thus, for each event day, , the average abnormal 


























      
   The t-statistic tests the null hypothesis, 0H , whether, on average, the event has 
no impact on the behaviour of returns. The above t-statistic assumes that abnormal 
returns are independent in the cross-section. This is not unrealistic since news 
announcements take place randomly.  
3.3 Testing cumulative abnormal returns 
On any given event day, cumulative abnormal return before or after the 
announcement is obtained by accumulating the estimates of  i . Let 
)'ˆˆˆ(ˆ 2721 iiii    denote the vector of estimated abnormal returns, and 
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let iVˆ  denote the estimated variance covariance matrix of these estimates. Define a 
27 element vector   having ones in pre- or post-event window and zero 
elsewhere. For example, if we wish to evaluate cumulative abnormal returns on 
the five-day pre-event period, only the first five elements of   are set to one. For 
the 20 days post-event period, only the last 20 elements are set to one. 
   The estimated cumulative abnormal return for any arbitrary window in an event 
i and the variance of this estimate are given by  
iiRAC  ˆ)(
ˆ '  
 ii Vˆ)(ˆ
'2   
   To test whether the cumulative abnormal event is, on average, significant across 




























)(   
   If the estimation window is large, the statistic )(t  is well approximated by the 
standard normal. Again, it is reasonable to assume cross-sectional independence 
since the announcements occur randomly both across time and across firms. 
4 Results 
In this section we examine the results of the event study tests by testing the event 
day returns reaction, followed by pre-event and post-events returns patterns. 
When discussing the results, the term “investors” is used to signify all categories 
of market participants. The results are summarised in Tables 1 to 12. To save 
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space, the tables contain abnormal returns for five days before and after the event 
regardless of the significance of those abnormal returns. Abnormal returns beyond 
the 5 day window are only shown when they are statistically significant. 
4.1 Announcements 
The first news category, profit announcements, includes final and interim profit 
announcements, and all other ad-hoc announcements. Tables 1 and 2 show the 
abnormal returns from final and interim profit announcements, including profit 
up, profit down and loss. A number of interesting results are evident. 
 [Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
   Firstly, all of the news types for both interim and final results evidence a highly 
significant returns reaction on the event day, except for final profit down. This 
exception might be explained by investors using the interim announcement to 
predict the outcome of the final announcement (Pincus, 1983). Indeed, Shores 
(1990) suggests that interim information can reduce the absolute value of the 
market’s unexpected earnings at the final earnings announcement date. 
   Secondly, the significant positive returns reaction to a final profit up (1.34%) 
greatly exceeds the insignificant positive returns reaction to final profit down 
(0.23%), but is almost exactly mirrored by the significant negative returns 
reaction to a final loss (-1.40%). The insignificant reaction to final profit down, 
might also be explained by the mixed signal effect: bad news (profit is down) is 
partly offset by good news (there is some profit after all). With regard to interim 
event day reactions, the profit up produces a significant but smaller than final 
positive reaction (0.79%) whereas the loss produces a significant negative 
reaction (-1.36%) of similar size to the final announcement. Interestingly, the 
interim profit down produces a significant negative reaction (-1.04%) in contrast 
to the final profit down. Evidently, once investors observe an interim profit down 
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signal, they assume that it is unlikely that the profit trend will be reversed before 
the final announcement date: investors are less surprised by final profits down 
than by other profit announcements. 
   Thirdly, in the pre-event period, only interim and final profit up announcements 
appear to be anticipated by investors. The ACARs for the pre-announcement 
interval are significant at the 5% level for both profit announcements, with 
cumulative pre-event effects of 0.41% for the final profit up and 0.44% for 
interim profit up. Clearly, good news are leaked to the market whereas mixed 
news (profit down) and bad news (loss) are not. One explanation is that some clue 
of the financial report outcome has been received by the market (Morse, 1981). 
Alternatively, it might be that: sources of information other than the annual 
income statement cause investors to adjust stock prices in advance (Ball and 
Brown, 1968); the interim report pre-empts insider trading by disseminating 
information which is otherwise only subjectively held (Opong, 1995); or the most 
surprising important announcements are released to the public prior to the official 
announcement, perhaps even by conveying a hidden message to the press and 
analysts (Skinner, 1994; Elton and Gruber, 1995). Our results therefore provide 
evidence against the strong form of the EMH. 
   Fourthly, in the post-event period there is a significant reversal pattern 
(significant ACARs at the 1% level) for final and interim profit up and for final 
loss. The ACAR for the 20 day post event window is -1.57% for the interim profit 
up and -1.95% for the final profit up, whilst for the final loss the ACAR is 5.41%. 
Thus we observe initial investor over-reaction followed by a correction, all within 
a short-term window. Contrary to the EMH, which predicts an equal balance of 
over and under-reaction across news events, the significant post-event reactions 
are all over-reactions followed by reversal corrections, the large part of these 
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typically occurring within the first five days, consistent with the findings of 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmayam (1998). 
   The abnormal return results for the ad-hoc profit announcements, which are 
often qualitative in nature and occur irregularly, are given in Table 3. The patterns 
of returns for positive and negative announcements differ greatly from the more 
formal financial statement related announcements.  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
   Firstly, there is a marked reaction asymmetry in that the returns reaction to 
negative news is greater (-4.78%) than the reaction to positive news (0.87%), 
whilst both reactions are highly significant. One explanation may be that, 
cognisant of litigation threats and the need for investor transparency, company 
directors would rather under-emphasise good news and over-emphasise bad news. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Skinner (1994) who noted that good 
news is released by companies more frequently than bad news as a means of 
addressing short-term mispricing, with bad news being released more discretely as 
a means of avoiding large negative earnings surprises. Indeed, Beaver (1968) 
notes that profit warnings diminish in their impact with the frequency of 
announcements. Secondly, there is little evidence of pre-event leakage as the 
ACAR in both cases is insignificant, even though there is an isolated significant 
ARR in each case. Thirdly, and somewhat unexpectedly, we do not observe post-
event correction to the sizeable reaction to negative profit news, whereas we do 
observe a significant correction at the 1% level when a positive profit 
announcement is made (with a ACAR of -2.08%). Perhaps this over-reaction is 
again symptomatic of the greater frequency of positive profit news 
announcements and their reduced true economic impact as a result. 
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4.2 Corporate restructuring 
The first news announcement type in this category, corporate mergers, includes 
mergers with the company as bidder, mergers with the company as target, and 
terminated merger negotiations. Table 4 shows the abnormal returns patterns 
associated with these news announcements. We begin here with a comparison of 
the abnormal returns associated with merger deal announcements. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
   Firstly, regardless of whether bidder or target, there is a highly significant 
positive returns reaction on the event day, though the reaction has a greater 
magnitude for the target firm (2.91%) than the bidder firm (0.32%). The result 
that target shareholders receive economically larger wealth gains is consistent 
with Mandelker (1974), Asquith (1983), and Cheung and Shum (1993). Roll 
(1986) suggests that the implicit overpayment on the target’s shares is motivated 
by managerial hubris, as their overconfidence leads to an inaccurate estimation of 
both their ability and the target’s economic value. Shefrin (2002) argues that 
bidder shareholders invariably suffer from the “winner’s curse”, and further 
Burkart (1995) suggests that this curse will still occur, even if managers are free 
from individual biases due to the competitive situation they find themselves in or 
even their partial ownership of the target firm. 
   Secondly, in the pre-event period, there is significant leakage in bidder returns, 
but not in target returns. The ACAR for the pre-announcement interval are 
significant at the 1% level for bidder returns, with cumulative pre-event effects of 
0.51%. Leakage is particularly marked in the last two days before announcement 
(0.14% and 0.19%, respectively). Halpern (1982) argued that such leakage may be 
the result of insider trading or the signal provided by previous successful tender 
offers, thereby increasing the likelihood of future merger plans. Alternatively, 
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Seyhun (1990) argues that such leakage is a result of hubris bias and thus 
overconfidence, leading to a systematic overestimation of merger synergy gains, a 
reluctance to issue new equity, and a tendency for repurchases leading up to the 
announcement date. For the target firm, day -3 returns are significant at the 1% 
level, but not the ACAR for the overall pre-announcement period. Further 
evidence supporting the no-leakage hypothesis is provided by the large negative 
return the day before announcement, which is significant at the 10% level. 
   Thirdly, in the post-event period, the bidder company’s abnormal returns tend to 
drift upwards whilst the target’s drift downwards. Whilst days 8 and 9 evidence 
significant abnormal returns at the 1% level, for the bidder the 20 day ACAR is 
insignificant in this case and in the case of the target. Thus, there is no evidence of 
significant post-announcement correction, contrary to the experimental findings of 
Wansley, Roenfeldt, and Cooley (1983). 
   Table 4 shows the abnormal returns associated with news of a terminated 
merger negotiation. Clearly, the results show little abnormal return impact of this 
news, either on the event day or in anticipation or following the news. This result 
is perhaps surprising given the at times significant costs associated with a 
terminated negotiation, though termination fee provisions may well alleviate these 
costs in practice (Officer, 2003; Bates and Lemmon, 2003). 
   The second news announcement type in this category is restructuring, and 
includes the announcement of a joint venture/strategic alliance, a company 
reorganisation, and the appointment of an investment banker. Table 5 shows the 
abnormal returns patterns associated with these news announcements.  
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
   Joint ventures and strategic alliances differ from mergers in the respect that the 
parental management remains intact and independent from the other party (Chan, 
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Kensinger, Keown, and Martin, 1997). We should expect the market to reward 
such ventures where they are perceived to deliver valuable investment 
opportunities and punish them otherwise (Mohanram and Nanda, 1998; Chen, Ho, 
Lee, and Yeo, 2000). Further, shareholders of the smaller party tend to gain more 
than those of the bigger party (McConnell and Nantell, 1985; Mohanram and 
Nanda, 1998). Restructuring, on the other hand, encompasses any news regarding 
the revision of the firm’s business structure, including financial or asset 
restructuring, refocusing, relocation, operating level reduction, spin-offs, and so 
on. Here, it is the managerial motivation and associated prospects of the action 
which are important, rather than the action itself (Chan, Gau, and Wang, 1995). 
Whilst managers would like to signal value creation as their motivation (Pike and 
Neale, 2003), where intentions are unclear we might expect a negative price 
response (Khurana and Lippincott, 2000).  
   Table 5 reveals that there is little market reaction to news of joint 
ventures/strategic alliances or to company reorganisation. Event day abnormal 
returns are small and insignificant at 0.23% and 0.00%, respectively. There are 
significant abnormal returns at the 5% level on day 11 for the former and day 10 
for the latter, though we can ignore there as isolated cases. Either markets do not 
appear to value the synergistic efficiency or other gains at the news announcement 
date, or perhaps consider these to be difficult to quantify at the outset. The result 
contrasts greatly with the earlier results for mergers. Perhaps markets consider 
that a certain proportion of joint ventures/strategic alliances are driven by 
managerial misalignment (Mohanram and Nanda, 1998), or the lack of synergy 
gains or the focus-diminishing nature of many vertical or conglomerate ventures 
(Johnson and Houston, 2000). The lack of small but positive market reaction to 
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company reorganization also runs counter to expectations (Burch and Nanda, 
2003; Chemmanur and Yan, 2004; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2004). 
   It is possible that a finer division of news events within each category would 
lead to more significant results, particularly if analysed in conjunction with further 
information concerning underlying firm performance. For example, joint 
ventures/strategic alliances and reorganisation in firms which are performing well 
may give rise to a positive market reaction whereas the same strategies for firms 
performing badly may give rise to a negative reaction. In this study we observe 
only the average reaction across all firms, which may give rise to the zero or near 
zero net reaction. 
   Table 5 shows the significant positive abnormal returns reaction to the 
appointment of an investment banker. On the announcement day, there is a returns 
reaction of 0.71%, significant at the 1% level. This is perhaps a surprising result 
given the routine nature of the news. Whilst we cannot draw upon previous 
studies in this area, we know that markets react positively to the news of 
accounting and finance officer appointments (Geiger, Lennox, and North, 2008), 
and the appointment of prestigious investment bankers in initial public offerings 
(Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Carter, Dark, and Singh, 1998). In our study, pre-
event and post-event reactions are insignificant, except for a single day 20 
abnormal return which is significant at the 1% level. 
   The final news type in the corporate restructuring category that we examine here 
is divestment or contraction. Further, we distinguish here between internal 
divestment, where the firm reduces its productive asset base through closing 
divisions or plants, and external divestment, where the firm reduces its holdings of 
other firm’s financial assets. In recent decades western economies have 
experienced a reduction in diversification activity as firms focus more on core 
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activities – economies of scope were seen as no longer worth pursuing (Comment 
and Jarrell, 1995; John and Ofek, 1995). Such economies entered into a period of 
revenue-focusing (Chalos and Chen, 2002). If the market perceives that a 
divestment will be favourable in that it will generate tangible cost savings then it 
will react positively, whereas if the divestment is expected to merely lead to an 
unfavourable reduction in productive capacity then it will react negatively. 
Statman and Sepe (1989) propose a positive market reaction to the release of 
funds for alternative projects with better prospects or for purposes of cost 
reduction. Table 6 enables the comparison of the abnormal returns associated with 
each news type. 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
   There is a positive abnormal returns response of 0.41% to internal divestment 
which is significant at the 1% level, whereas the response to external divestment 
is insignificant. Thus, the market typically views internal divestment positively, 
assuming that firm managers have arrived at the divestment decision by means of 
an objective abandonment option NPV analysis. This result contrasts with the 
findings of Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990) and Gombola and Tsetsekos 
(1992), where a negative market reaction was found, as markets observe a 
negative signal often associated with reduced demand for the firm’s products, 
declining profitability, and treat the news as symptomatic of wider firm concerns. 
   The lack of market reaction to the divestment of financial assets, external 
divestment, is entirely expected as firms routinely increase or decrease external 
investments as their working capital requirements change. Indeed, this finding is 
consistent with the assertion of Jain (1985) and John and Ofek (1995), that after 
external divestment the firm’s operations are unaffected. With regard to both 
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internal and external divestment, neither pre-event nor post-event ACARs prove 
to be significant.  
4.3 Market sentiment 
The third news category, market sentiment includes investment analyst positive 
(buy), negative (sell) and neutral (hold) recommendations. Such analysts research 
individual shares and produce reports for their clients such as fund managers. In 
so doing, they not only provide detailed information on a share, but also 
information on their sentiment regarding the share’s intrinsic value in relation to 
the current market price (Francis and Soffer, 1997). If markets are efficient, then 
all publicly available information relevant to intrinsic share value should at all 
times be subsumed within price. Thus analyst recommendations should not give 
rise to abnormal returns patterns. However, we know that in practice investment 
banks maintain expensive security analysis teams and also that investors consider 
analyst advice an important information source when making their investment 
decisions (Hirst, Koonce, and Simko, 1995). Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) 
suggest that the value of analyst recommendations may lie either in their special 
skill at analysing available information or in their ability to discover insider 
information. Table 7 shows the abnormal returns associated with each analyst 
recommendation announcement. 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
   On the event day, we observe significant returns reactions at the 1% level for 
both positive and negative recommendations with abnormal returns of 0.93% and 
-0.52% respectively, but an insignificant response to a neutral recommendation. 
These results clearly suggest that the market is far from efficient in its reaction to 
recommendation news. 
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   In the pre-event period, we observe a significant negative ACAR at the 1% level 
for negative recommendations, with significant negative abnormal returns in the 
two days leading up to announcement. Therefore there is significant leakage 
associated with a negative recommendation. With regard to positive 
recommendations there is a significant positive abnormal return one day before 
the event at the 1% level, though the pre-event ACAR is not significant. There is 
thus evidence of significant leakage in respect of both positive and negative 
recommendation news. We observe no significant leakage for a neutral 
recommendation. 
   In the post-event period, whilst there is no mis-reaction after the event day for 
the positive recommendation news, for the negative recommendation we observe 
an abnormal return of -0.37% for the day after the announcement which is 
significant at the 1% level, consistent at least in part with the post earnings 
announcement drift anomaly established by Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990). 
There is thus significant under-reaction to negative recommendations which is 
corrected after the event. 
   The results taken as a whole reveal an interesting abnormal returns pattern. 
Consistent with Skinner (1994) and Ryan and Taffler (2006), negative news 
generates a more pronounced and enduring price effect than positive news. 
Indeed, in our study we observe a four day cumulative abnormal returns of -
2.13% associated with the negative recommendation, whereas there is only a two 
day positive abnormal returns totalling 1.28% associated with the positive news. 
Given that investment bankers rely on commissions from their large corporate 
clients, they are more likely to give buy recommendations than sell 
recommendations on the shares of their clients. Indeed, Shefrin (2002) found that 
in 2000, more than 70% of all US analyst recommendations were “buys”, Ryan 
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and Taffler (2006) find that the sell-to-buy recommendation ratio is even higher 
for the UK, and Shiller (2005) also notes that analyst recommendations have been 
subject to some inflation in recent years. As a result, sell recommendations are 
more “visible” (Shefrin, 2002) and investors are likely to react to them in a more 
pronounced manner.  
   We should also expect neutral recommendations to exert a significant negative 
influence on abnormal returns. However, whilst the reaction here is negative, it is 
not significant.  
   In sum, the returns reaction to analyst recommendations is inconsistent with the 
EMH in that analyst recommendations contain economically valuable 
information, there is pre-event leakage for both positive and negative 
recommendations, and post-event under-reaction for negative recommendations. 
One important caveat here is that there may be a lag between an analyst making a 
recommendation and that news being recorded on Bloomberg. This could explain 
the significant abnormal returns reactions for positive and negative 
recommendations the day before the event day in each case. 
4.4 Growth and investment 
The fourth news category of growth and investment includes both internal and 
external expansion, and new product (or service) and new customer (or contract). 
As discussed in the corporate restructuring category, a firm can invest or divest 
either internally, by increasing or reducing real productive capacity; or externally, 
by increasing or decreasing their holdings of the financial assets of other 
companies. Internal investment is likely to be well regarded by the market, except 
where it involves unrelated diversification (Rumelt, 1982; Comment and Jarrell, 
1995). Table 8 shows the abnormal returns associated with internal and external 
expansion news. 
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 [Insert Table 8 here] 
   Clearly, both internal and external expansions produce a significant positive 
abnormal returns response on the event day. Internal expansion news generates a 
0.49% response whereas external expansion news generates a smaller 0.29% 
response, both of which are significant at the 1% level. The results are somewhat 
surprising as whilst we might expect a significant market response to internal 
investment news, external investment may be merely the result of short-term 
working capital requirements (transitory excess liquidity) and therefore should not 
have a significant returns impact as the firm’s productive capacity remains 
unchanged. 
   In the pre-event period, we observe some weak evidence of leakage in relation 
to internal investment news, with five successive positive abnormal return days 
leading up to the event day. Whilst these abnormal returns are individually 
insignificant, the ACAR is significant at the 5% level.  In the post-event period, 
there are positive abnormal returns on day 3 for each news type. However, there is 
no apparent explanation for this and neither post-event ACAR is significant. 
   In sum, there is some evidence of pre-event leakage with investment news. 
Perhaps ‘more informed investors’ trade the share intensively in anticipation of 
this important corporate disclosure, consistent with John and Mishra (1990), 
Giammarino, Heinkel, and Hollifield (1994), and Del Brio, Perote, and Pindado 
(2003). 
   The second news type within this category is the announcement of new product 
(or service) and new customer (or contract). A well-accepted means of achieving 
corporate competitiveness is to set in place continual innovation strategies (Chan, 
Martin and Kensinger, 1990). Table 9 gives the abnormal returns from these two 
news types. 
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 [Insert Table 9 here] 
   The market reacts positively to each news type. The returns reactions are 0.76% 
for a new product (service) and 0.86% for a new customer (contract), both of 
which are significant at the 1% level. It is perhaps not surprising that markets 
react favourably to the news of potentially higher future cash flow streams, as 
these feed directly into intrinsic share value. 
   In the pre-event period, there is some abnormal returns volatility in the case of 
new customer (contract) news, with significant abnormal returns at the 1% for 
days -3 and -1. However, neither pre-event ACAR is significant. One explanation 
is that whilst news of a new product or service is highly confidential and therefore 
leakage is far less likely, news of a new customer or contract deal is more likely to 
be in the public domain. Further, until that deal is agreed, the uncertainty may 
give rise to abnormal return volatility, in this case swinging between negative and 
positive abnormal returns. In the post-event period, ACARs are insignificant for 
both news types. 
   In sum, the market regards announcements of new product/service or new 
customer/contract as positive, giving rise to a potentially higher future stream of 
cash flows to the firm and its investors. This information is reflected rapidly in 
share price, with little evidence of pre-event leakage and no evidence of post-
event correction. 
   Overall, the results for the growth and investment category are broadly 
consistent with the positive abnormal returns of previous studies such as 
Woolridge and Snow (1990), Chaney and Devinney (1992), Chan, Gau, and 
Wang (1995), and Chen et al. (2000). 
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4.5 Dividends and financing 
The fifth category includes dividend announcements and equity financing 
announcements. Dividend announcements, in turn, are divided into regular 
dividend announcements and special dividend announcements. However, it is 
noted that regular dividend announcements here are those which are not 
announced in conjunction with profit announcements. The signalling hypothesis 
proposes that managers use dividend payments as a signalling mechanism to 
communicate private information to help investors to value the prospective 
earnings of the firm. Markets tend to react positively to dividend information as 
knowledge of dividends lowers the variability of returns and produces a useful 
signal regarding subsequent reinvestment policy (Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Sant 
and Cowan, 1994). Whilst regular dividends represent an implicit commitment to 
maintain a given payout ratio, special dividends represent a one-off reward 
distribution and entail no such commitment. Managers will not increase their 
dividend payout ratio unless future cash flows allow (Petit, 1972; Healy and 
Palepu, 1988). Whilst special dividends cause a transitory signal about future 
profitability, regular dividends convey a more permanent signal (Brickley, 1983; 
Gombola and Liu, 1999; and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2000). We 
should therefore expect both types of dividend signal to give rise to positive 
market reactions. Table 10 shows the abnormal returns from the two types of 
dividend announcement. 
 [Insert Table 10 here] 
   Interestingly, on the event day, whilst regular dividend and special dividend 
news gives rise to positive abnormal returns reactions, neither is significant. It is 
entirely possible that the related economic information content of these 
announcements has already been subsumed within price following a previous 
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news announcement. With regard to special dividends, DeAngelo et al. (2000) 
argue that as special dividend announcements have become as predictable as 
regular dividends over the last 40 years, these news announcements have lost their 
importance in terms of conveying additional useful information. Neither the pre-
event nor the post-event ACARs are significant, and therefore we observe no pre-
event leakage or post-event mis-reaction. The market is therefore broadly neutral 
to these dividend announcements. 
   Moving on to the equity financing decision, we study both share issues and 
share repurchases. The information signalling hypothesis suggests that finance 
managers tend to issue shares when they have a financing requirement and believe 
the firm’s shares to be overvalued, whereas they repurchase shares when they 
have excess cash and believe their shares to be undervalued (Loughran and Ritter, 
1995; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen, 2000; Montier, 2004; and Zhang, 2005). Dierkens (1991) argues that 
new share issues signal unfavourable information about a firm’s economic 
opportunities to the market, thereby leading to a fall in share price thereafter, 
whereas repurchasing signals favourable information regarding future 
performance (Lie, 2005) or signals a takeover defence (Vermaelen, 1984). We 
should thus expect negative abnormal returns to be associated with a share issue 
and positive returns associated with a share repurchase announcement. If nothing 
else, the latter is mechanical as the number of shares is reduced, ceteris paribus. 
Table 11 shows the abnormal returns associated with share issues and 
repurchases. 
 [Insert Table 11] 
   The event-day response, whilst producing the expected abnormal returns sign, is 
insignificant for each news type, contrary to the existing literature. Further, 
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although we observe a significant negative abnormal return for share repurchase 
news at day -1, it is only significant at the 5% level and the sign is contrary to 
expectations. Interestingly, however, in the case of both share issues and 
repurchases, there is evidence of significant under-reaction on the event day, as 
the ACARs in both cases evidence corrections which are significant at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. For share issues, the initial under-reaction gives rise to 
subsequent further significant negative correction on days 2, 7 and 9 following the 
event day. For share repurchases, the initial under-reaction gives rise to 
subsequent further significant positive corrections on days 2 and 16. Evidently, 
then, the market reacts relatively slowly to share issues and repurchases, though in 
the direction expected. 
   If we compare regular dividend news and share repurchase news 
announcements, our results suggest that they are not treated by the market as 
substitute actions. Gelb (2000), Guay and Harford (2000), and Jagannathan, 
Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) report that firms with large permanent operating 
cash flows are more likely to issue dividends, whereas firms with large transient 
non-operating cash flows are more likely to repurchase their shares. Our results 
confirm that the former are predictable and therefore contain no additional 
economic information whereas the latter are less predictable and contain useful 
economic information. In general, then, dividend announcements contain little 
news which the market does not already have, whereas changing the equity base 
of the firm is not immediately, but is certainly after some reflection, a newsworthy 
event of economic consequence. 
4.6 Miscellaneous news 
The sixth and final news announcement category collects all news not included in 
the other categories above into good, bad and ambiguous news types. Whilst we 
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clearly expect miscellaneous good news to produce a positive abnormal returns 
reaction, and miscellaneous bad news to produce a negative abnormal returns 
reaction, we do not expect ambiguous news to produce a reaction at all. Table 12 
shows the abnormal returns arising from the three news announcement types. 
 [Insert Table 12 here] 
   The abnormal returns reaction on the event day is consistent with expectations: 
miscellaneous good news gives rise to positive returns of 1.41%, whilst 
miscellaneous bad news gives rise to negative abnormal returns of -0.57%, both of 
which are significant at the 1% level. Ambiguous news produces an insignificant 
positive abnormal returns reaction of 0.26% on the event day. Thus, the market 
clearly acknowledges the economic information content in miscellaneous good 
and bad news. 
   In the pre-event period, there is significant evidence of leakage with respect to 
miscellaneous good news but not miscellaneous bad news. The ACAR for the 5 
days leading up to the event day is 1.12% which is significant at the 1% level, 
with significant leakage evident in the final two days before announcement. In the 
post-event period, there is no evidence of mis-reaction for either miscellaneous 
good or bad news. In terms of miscellaneous ambiguous news, there is a single 
negative correction on day 13, significant at the 5% level, and the ACAR is 
significant at the 10% level. There is thus some weak evidence that markets are 
not well suited to gauging the effect of ambiguous news as ‘markets hate 
uncertainty’, leading at times to a small correction at a later date once the likely 
impact of that news has been analysed more thoroughly. 
   Far from being efficient, this paper demonstrates that investors react to UK 
stock exchange listed company news announcements in a manner which is 
somewhat removed from the expectations of an efficient market. We not only 
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observe significant news leakage, but also frequent subsequent correction 
consistent with an initial share price over-reaction. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper sought to investigate the behaviour of returns around news 
announcements for UK quoted companies, testing 30 different news 
announcement types over 100 UK companies over a 10 year period. The results 
provide some insight into the efficiency of markets and enable us to consider 
whether the EMH or behavioural finance best describe the returns reaction of 
investors to corporate news announcements. If EMH holds and investors react 
rationally, stock prices will adjust immediately and correctly (on average) to 
reflect published information – thus we would observe no abnormal returns before 
or after the event whereas if behavioural finance theories best explain returns 
reactions then new information will take time to disseminate and be reflected in 
prices and we will see evidence of drift, reversals, and so on.  
   Firstly, it is clear that corporate events do convey important economic 
information to investors. The change in equilibrium stock price around and during 
the announcements supports the contention that investors have modified their 
expectations of future firm earnings. Further, market participants do not only 
acknowledge the news, they appear to understand it in that they react more 
strongly to news with long-term than transitory implications for the firm, and they 
do not react where the economic implications are ambiguous. 
   Secondly, the market response to negative news is generally stronger than its 
response to positive news in that positive news announcements in general do not 
generate as large and long-lasting abnormal returns effects as negative 
announcements. The relative frequency of release of positive news observed in 
our study tends to diminish its effect, consistent with Skinner (1994).  
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   Thirdly, whilst in general investor responses following corporate events were 
consistent with the existing literature in terms of direction, the initial response 
evidenced underreaction (and subsequent drift) or overreaction (and subsequent 
correction) in certain cases. 
   The results taken as a whole clearly question some of the central propositions of 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and Fama’s more recent defence of it in the light 
of some challenging empirical evidence. It takes time for news information to be 
incorporated into the price share, so whilst stock prices correctly (on average) 
reflect published information they do not always do so immediately as suggested 
by the EMH. Fama (1998) states that anomalies may occur by chance and thus we 
should expect an equal probability of under- and over-reaction. However, our 
results show four significant over-reaction cases and only two cases of significant 
under-reaction, and 20 per cent of news announcements giving rise to such 
anomalies. Both the frequency of incidence of anomalies and their mix tends to 
reject an efficient markets explanation. If markets are efficient in the strong-form 
then we should not observe a significant reaction to analyst recommendations, 
whereas we observe significant reactions to both positive and negative 
recommendations in our study, implying that investors believe they contain 
valuable economic information. Finally, the incidence of information leakage in a 
number of news types suggests that markets have mechanisms for the release of 
private information, again rejecting strong-form efficiency. 
   If the EMH fails to explain the behaviour of UK investors in response to a wide 
range of news announcements, what alternative explanations might we explore? 
The behavioural finance explanations of Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) provide us with some insights into over-reaction and 
under-reaction based on investor psychology. However, as they focus on event 
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windows of up to 5 years, they necessarily fail to provide much insight into 
behaviour over our post-event window of only 20 days. There is, therefore, a 
interesting venue for research to explore different behavioural explanations in the 
very short-term, as concepts such as representativeness in over-reaction and 
conservatism in under-reaction are clearly longer-term phenomena in the existing 
empirical literature.  
Notes 
1. For robustness we used both unit and zero beta models to compute abnormal 
returns. The results were very similar to those obtain by the market model. 
References 
Äijö, J.: Impact of US and UK macroeconomic news announcements on the return distribution 
implied by FTSE-100 index options. Int Rev Financ Anal 17, 242-258 (2008) 
Asquith, P.: Mergers Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns. J Financ Econ 11, 51-83 (1983) 
Asquith, P., Mullins, D.W.: The impact of initiating dividend payments on shareholders’ wealth. J 
Bus 46, 77-96 (1983) 
Ball, R., Brown, P.: An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. J Account Res. 6, 
159-178 (1968) 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.: A Model of Investor Sentiment. J Financ Econ 49 307-343 
(1998) 
Bates, T.W., Lemmon, M.L.: Breaking up is hard to do? An Analysis of termination fee provisions 
and merger outcomes. J Financ Econ 69, 469-504 (2003) 
Beaver, W.H.: The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements. J Account Res 6, 
67-92 (1968) 
Bernard, V.L., Thomas, J.K.: Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed Price Response or Risk 
Premium? J Account Res 27, 1-36 (1989) 
Bernard, V.L., Thomas, J.K.: Evidence that Stock Prices do not Fully Reflect The Implications of 
Current Earnings for Future Earnings. J Account Econ 13, 305-340 (1990) 
Blackwell, D.W., Marr, M.W., Spivey, M.F.: Plant-Closing Decisions and the Market Value of the 
Firm. J Financ Econ 26, 277-288 (1990) 
Brickley, J.A.: Shareholder Wealth, Information Signaling and the Specially Designated Dividend. 
J Financ Econ 12, 187-209 (1983) 
Burch, T.R., Nanda, V.: Divisional Diversity and the Conglomerate Discount: Evidence from 
Spinoffs. J Financ Econ 70, 69-98 (2003) 
Burkart, M.: Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests. J Financ 50, 1491-1515 
(1995) 
Campbell, J.Y., Lo, A.W., Craig Mackinlay, A.: The Econometrics of Financial Markets. 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey (1997) 
Carter, R.B., Dark, F.H., Singh, A.K.: Underwriter Reputation, and the Long-Run Performance of 
IPO Stocks. J Financ 53 (1), 285-311 (1998)  
Chalos, P., Chen, C.J.P.: Employee Downsizing Strategies: Market Reaction and Post 
Announcement Financial Performance. J Bus Financ Account 29 (5-6), 847-870 (2002) 
Chan, S.H., Gau, G.W., Wang, K.: Stock Market Reaction to Capital Investment Decisions: 
Evidence from Business Relocations. J Financ Quant Anal 30 (1), 81-100 (1995) 
Chan, S.H., Kensinger, J.W., Keown, A.J., Martin, J.D.: Do Strategic Alliances Create Value? J 
Financ Econ 46, 199-221 (1997) 
32 
Chan, S.H., Martin, J.D., Kensinger, J.W.: Corporate Research and Development Expenditures and 
Share Value. J Financ Econ 26, 255-276 (1990) 
Chaney, P.K., Devinney, T.M.: New Product Innovations and Stock Price Performance. J Bus 
Financ Account 19 (5), 677-695 (1992) 
Chemmanur, T.J., Yan, A.: A Theory of Corporate Spin-Offs. J Financ Econ 72, 259-290 (2004) 
Chen, S.S., Ho, K.W., Lee, C., Yeo, G.H.H.: Investment Opportunities, Free Cash Flow and 
Market Reaction to International Joint Ventures. J Bank Financ 24, 1747-1765 (2000) 
Cheung, Y.L., Shum, C.K.: Corporate Takeover and Shareholders' Wealth in Hong Kong. Brit 
Account Rev 25, 213-226 (1993) 
Clare, A., Morgan, G., Thomas, S.: Direct Evidence of Non-Trading on the London Stock 
Exchange. J Bus Financ Account 29 (1-2), 29-53 (2002) 
Comment, R., Jarrell, G.A.: Corporate Focus and Stock Returns. J Financ Econ 37, 67-87 (1995) 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A.: Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- 
and Overreactions. J Financ 53 (6), 1839-1885 (1998) 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Skinner, D.J.: Special Dividends and the Evolution of Dividend 
Signalling. J Financ Econ 57, 309-354 (2000) 
Del Brio, E.B., Perote, J., Pindado, J.: Measuring the Impact of Corporate Investment 
Announcements on Share Price: The Spanish Experience. J Bus Financ Account 30 (5-6), 715-747 
(2003) 
Dierkens, N.: Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues. J Financ Quant Anal 26 (2), 181-199 
(1991) 
Dittmar, A.K.: Why Do Firms Repurchase Stock? J Bus 73 (3), 331-355 (2000) 
Donnelly, R.: Accounting, board independence and contagion effects from adverse press 
comment: The case of Elan. Brit Account Rev 40, 245-259 (2008) 
Elton, E.J., Gruber, M.J.: Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, 
New Jersey (1995) 
Fama, E.F.: Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns, and Behavioural Finance. J Financ Econ 49, 
382-306 (1998) 
Fama, E.F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M.C., Roll, R.: The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New 
Information. Int Econ Rev 10 (1), 1-21 (1969) 
Foerster, S.R., Keim, D.B.: Direct Evidence on Non-Trading of NYSE and AMEX Stocks. 
Research Working Paper 19-93, Wharton School Rodney L White Center for Financial Research, 
University of Pennsylvania (1993) 
Francis, J., Soffer, L.: The Relative Informativeness of Analysts' Stock Recommendations and 
Earnings Forecast Revisions. J Account Res 35 (2), 193-211 (1997) 
Geiger, M.A., Lennox, C.S., North, D.S.: The Hiring of Accounting and Finance Officers from 
Audit Firms: How did the Market React? Rev Account Stud 13 (1), 55-86 (2008) 
Gelb, D.: Payout Composition and Investor’s Reaction to Dividend and Stock Repurchase 
Announcements. Working Paper, Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University, January 
(2000) 
Giammarino, R., Heinkel, R., Hollifield, B.: Corporate Financing Decisions and Anonymous 
Trading. J Financ Quant Analy 29 (3), 351-377 (1994) 
Gombola, M.J., Liu, F.Y.: The Signalling Power of Specially Designated Dividends. J Financ 
Quant Anal 34 (3), 409-424 (1999) 
Gombola, M.J., Tsetsekos, G.P.: The Information Content of Plant Closing Announcements: 
Evidence from Financial Profiles and the Stock Price Reaction. Financ Manag 21 (2), 31-40 
(1992) 
Guay, W., Harford, J.: The Cash-flow Permanence and Information Content of Dividend Increase 
versus Repurchases. J Financ Econ 57, 385-415 (2000) 
Halpern, P.: Corporate Acquisition: A Theory of Special Cases? A Review of Event Studies 
Applied to Acquisitions. J Financ 38 (2), 297-317 (1982) 
Healy, P.M., Palepu, K.G.: Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and 
Omissions. J Financ Econ 21, 149-175 (1988) 
Hirst, D. E., Koonce, L., Simko, P.J.: Investor Reactions to Financial Analysts' Research Reports. 
J Account Res 33 (2), 335-351 (1995) 
Ikenberry D., Lakonishok, J., Vermaelen, T.: Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and 
Strategic Trading. J Financ 55 (5), 2373-2397 (2000) 
Ivkovic, Z., Jegadeesh, N.: The Timing and Value of Forecast and Recommendation Revisions. J 
Financ Econ 73, 433-463 (2004) 
Jagannathan, M., Stephens, C.P., Weisbach, M.S.: Financial Flexibility and the Choice Between 
Dividends and Stock Repurchases. J Financ Econ 57, 355-384 (2000) 
33 
Jain, P.C.: The Effect of Voluntary Sell-Off Announcements on Shareholder Wealth. J Financ 40 
(1), 209-224 (1985) 
John, K., Mishra, B.: Information Content of Insider Trading Around Corporate Announcements: 
The Case of Capital Expenditures. J Financ 45 (3), 835-855 (1990) 
John, K., Ofek, E.: Asset Sales and Increase in Focus. J Financ Econ 37, 105-126 (1995) 
Johnson, S.A., Houston, M.B.: A Reexamination of the Motives and Gains in Joint Ventures. J 
Financ Quant Anal 35 (1), 67-85 (2000) 
Kadiyala, P., Rau, P.R.: Investor Reaction to Corporate Event Announcements: Underreaction or 
Overreaction? J Bus 77 (2), 357-386 (2004) 
Khurana, I.K., Lippincott, B.: Restructuring and Firm Value: The Effects of Profitability and 
Restructuring Purpose. J Bus Financ Account 27 (9-10), 1107-1129 (2000) 
Lie, E.: Operating Performance Following Open Market Share Repurchase Announcement. J 
Account Econ 39, 411-436 (2005) 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J.: The New Issues Puzzle. J Financ 50, 23-51 (1995) 
Mandelker, G.: Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms. J Financ Econ 2, 303-335 (1974) 
McConnell, J.J., Nantell, T.J.: Corporate Combinations and Common Stock Returns: The Case of 
Joint Ventures. J Financ 40 (2), 519-536 (1985) 
Michaely, R., Shaw, W.H.: The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse-Selection and 
Signaling Theories. Rev Financ Stud 7 (2), 279-319 (1994) 
Mohanram, P., Nanda, A.: When do Joint Ventures Create Value? available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=7382 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.7382 (1998). Accessed 2 November 2009  
Montier, J.: Behavioural Finance, Insights into Irrational Minds and Markets, John Wiley & Sons, 
New Jersey, (2004) 
Morse, D.: Price and Trading Volume Reaction Surrounding Earnings Announcements: A Closer 
Examination. J Account Res 19 (2), 374-383 (1981) 
Nikkinen, J., Sahlström, P.: Impact of the federal open market committee's meetings and scheduled 
macroeconomic news on stock market uncertainty. Int Rev Financ Anal 13, 1-12 (2004) 
Officer, M.S.: Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions. J Financ Econ 69, 431-467 (2003) 
Opong, K.K.: The Information Content of Interim Financial Reports: UK Evidence. J Bus Financ 
Account 22 (2), 269-279 (1995) 
Otchere, I., Ross, M.: Do share buy back announcements convey firm-specific or industry-wide 
information? A test of the undervaluation hypothesis. Int Rev Financ Anal 11, 511-531 (2002) 
Petit, R.: Dividend Announcements, Security Performance, and Capital Market Efficiency. J 
Financ 27 (5), 993-1007 (1972) 
Pike, R., Neale, B.: Corporate Finance and Investment, Decisions and Strategies, Prentice Hall, 
London (2003) 
Pincus, M.: Information Characteristics of Earnings Announcements and Stock Market Behavior. J 
Account Res 21 (1), 155-183 (1983) 
Roll, R.: The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeover. J Bus 59 (2), 197-216 (1986) 
Rumelt, R.P.: Diversification Strategy and Profitability. Strat Manag J 3 (4), 359-369 (1982) 
Ryan, P., Taffler, R.J.: Do Brokerage Houses Add Value? The Market Impact of UK Sell-Side 
Analyst Recommendation Changes. Brit Account Rev 38, 371-386 (2006) 
Salinger, M.: Standard Errors in Event Studies. J Financ Quant Anal 27 (1), 39-53 (1992) 
Sant, R., Cowan, A.R.: Do Dividends Signal Earnings? The Case of Omitted Dividends. J Bank 
Financ 18, 1113-1133 (1994) 
Seyhun, H.N.: Do Bidder Managers Knowingly Pay Too Much for Target Firms? J Bus 36 (4), 
439-464 (1990) 
Shefrin, H.: Beyond Greed and Fear. Understanding Behavioural Finance and the Psychology of 
Investing, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2002) 
Shiller, R. J.: Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (2005) 
Shores, D.: The Association Between Interim Information and Security Returns Surrounding 
Earnings Announcements. J Account Res 28 (1), 164-181 (1990) 
Skinner, D.J.: Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News. J Account Res 32 (1), 38-60 (1994) 
Statman, M., Sepe, J.F.: Project Termination Announcements and the Market Value of the Firm. 
Financ Manag 18, 74-81 (1989) 
Stephens, C.P., Weisbach, M.S.: Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-Market Repurchase 
Programs. J Financ 53 (1), 313-333 (1998) 
Thompson, R.: Conditioning the Return-Generating Process on Firm-Specific Events: A 
Discussion of Event Study Methods. J Financ Quant Anal 20 (2), 151-168 (1985) 
Veld, C., Veld-Merkoulova, Y.V.: Do Spin-offs Really Create Value? The European Case. J Bank 
Financ 28, 1111-1135 (2004) 
34 
Vermaelen, T.: Repurchase Tender Offers, Signalling, and Managerial Incentives. J Financ Quant 
Anal 19 (2), 163-181 (1984) 
Wansley, J.W., Roenfeldt, R.L., Cooley, P.L.: Abnormal Returns from Merger Profiles. J Financ 
Quant Anal 18 (2), 149-162 (1983) 
Woolridge, J.R., Snow, C.C.: Stock Market Reaction to Strategic Investment Decisions. Strat 
Manag J, 11 (5), 353-363 (1990) 
Zhang, H.: Share Price Performance Following Actual Share Repurchases. J Bank Financ 29, 
1887-1901 (2005)  
  
35 
Table 1     Final profit announcement 
 
  Final Profit up Final Profit Down Final Loss 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 0.05% 0.582  0.05% -0.07% -0.377  -0.07% -0.60% -1.554  -0.60% 
-4 0.06% 0.767  0.11% 0.08% 0.435  0.01% 0.45% 1.151  -0.15% 
-3 0.09% 1.091  0.20% -0.01% -0.072  0.00% -0.19% -0.505  -0.35% 
-2 0.10% 1.300  0.30% 0.12% 0.658  0.11% 0.64% 1.652  0.29% 
-1 0.10% 1.303  0.41% 0.17% 0.973  0.29% 0.59% 1.531  0.88% 
0 1.34% 23.347 **   0.23% 1.845    -1.40% -5.081 **   
1 0.02% 0.193  0.02% 0.24% 1.339  0.24% 0.37% 0.962  0.37% 
2 -0.10% -1.187  -0.08% 0.20% 1.133  0.44% 1.06% 2.740 ** 1.43% 
3 -0.17% -2.170 * -0.25% -0.05% -0.302  0.38% 0.48% 1.251  1.91% 
4 -0.10% -1.193  -0.35% 0.21% 1.169  0.59% 0.68% 1.770  2.60% 
5 -0.25% -3.156 ** -0.60% -0.08% -0.461  0.51% 0.51% 1.336  3.11% 
12 -0.21% -2.665 ** -1.32% -0.08% -0.457  -0.09% 0.16% 0.421  2.88% 
14 -0.21% -2.562 ** -1.62% -0.24% -1.364  -0.13% 0.13% 0.342  3.54% 
             
 ACAR T-Stat   ACAR T-Stat   ACAR T-Stat   
 (-1, -5) 2.170 *  (-1, -5) 0.699   (-1, -5) 0.983   
 (1, 20) -4.636 **  (1, 20) -0.288   (1, 20) 2.678 **  
 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 





Table 2     Interim profit announcement 
 
  Interim Profit up Interim Profit Down Interim Loss 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 0.06% 0.705  0.06% 0.08% 0.451  0.08% 0.01% 0.044  0.01% 
-4 0.13% 1.547  0.19% 0.04% 0.217  0.12% 0.38% 1.240  0.40% 
-3 0.09% 1.022  0.28% 0.09% 0.485  0.20% -0.01% -0.048  0.38% 
-2 0.01% 0.124  0.29% 0.10% 0.559  0.30% 0.25% 0.810  0.63% 
-1 0.16% 1.842  0.44% 0.04% 0.231  0.34% 0.24% 0.773  0.86% 
0 0.79% 12.983 **   -1.04% -8.234 **   -1.36% -6.299 **   
1 -0.04% -0.425  -0.04% -0.16% -0.890  -0.16% -0.23% -0.742  -0.23% 
2 0.09% 1.078  0.05% 0.01% 0.065  -0.14% 0.14% 0.467  -0.08% 
3 -0.24% -2.812 ** -0.18% -0.09% -0.521  -0.24% 0.04% 0.136  -0.04% 
4 -0.13% -1.504  -0.31% 0.09% 0.502  -0.15% 0.27% 0.895  0.23% 
5 -0.09% -1.076  -0.40% 0.05% 0.305  -0.09% 0.47% 1.558  0.70% 
9 -0.17% -1.967 * -0.93% 0.01% 0.070  -0.49% 0.40% 1.310  1.42% 
18 -0.09% -1.117  -1.58% -0.24% -1.394  -0.85% -0.61% -2.018 * 1.97% 
             
 ACAR T-Stat   ACAR T-Stat   ACAR T-Stat   
 (-1, -5) 2.255 *  (-1, -5) 0.831   (-1, -5) 1.227   
 (1, 20) -3.548 **  (1, 20) -1.147   (1, 20) 1.549   
 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 









Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 






 Positive Profit Announcement Negative Profit Announcement 
Day AAR T-Stat  ACAR AAR T-Stat  ACAR 
-5 0.03% 0.194  0.03% 0.05% 0.232  0.05% 
-4 0.05% 0.293  0.08% 0.16% 0.697  0.22% 
-3 -0.04% -0.235  0.04% -0.05% -0.232  0.16% 
-2 0.33% 2.014 * 0.38% -0.08% -0.339  0.08% 
-1 -0.12% -0.709  0.26% -0.46% -1.972 * -0.38% 
0 0.87% 7.306 **   -4.78% -28.329 **   
1 -0.19% -1.116  -0.19% 0.10% 0.445  0.10% 
2 -0.10% -0.602  -0.29% 0.11% 0.444  0.21% 
3 0.17% 0.993  -0.12% -0.02% -0.091  0.19% 
4 -0.14% -0.853  -0.26% 0.15% 0.648  0.34% 
5 -0.03% -0.184  -0.29% -0.02% -0.086  0.32% 
          
 ACAR T-Stat   ACAR T-Stat   
  (-1, -5) 0.672   (-1, -5) -0.693   
  (1, 20) -2.383 **  (1, 20) 0.616   
38 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 






Table 4     Mergers 
 
  With company as a bidder With company as a target Terminated negotiation 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 0.11% 1.378   0.11% 0.01% 0.019   0.01% 0.02% 0.052   0.02% 
-4 0.03% 0.424   0.15% -0.16% -0.286   -0.15% 0.48% 1.332   0.50% 
-3 0.04% 0.474   0.19% 1.65% 2.896 ** 1.50% -0.35% -0.979   0.15% 
-2 0.14% 1.673  0.32% 0.35% 0.602   1.85% 0.62% 1.692  0.76% 
-1 0.19% 2.266 * 0.51% -1.05% -1.852  0.79% -0.21% -0.573   0.56% 
0 0.32% 5.378 **   2.91% 7.180 **   -0.12% -0.470     
1 0.05% 0.665   0.05% 0.16% 0.274   0.16% 0.08% 0.224   0.08% 
2 -0.06% -0.775   -0.01% -0.08% -0.132   0.08% -0.18% -0.510   -0.10% 
3 0.02% 0.252   0.01% -0.11% -0.195   -0.03% 0.67% 1.848  0.56% 
4 -0.06% -0.791   -0.05% -0.14% -0.251   -0.17% -0.06% -0.159   0.51% 
5 -0.04% -0.492   -0.09% -0.33% -0.573   -0.50% -0.05% -0.139   0.46% 
8 0.22% 2.668 ** 0.05% 0.90% 1.586   -0.12% 0.18% 0.493   0.53% 
9 0.23% 2.775 ** 0.27% -0.95% -1.654  -1.07% -0.37% -1.011   0.17% 
                          
  ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     
  (-1, -5) 2.679 **   (-1, -5) 0.595    (-1, -5) 0.664    
  (1, 20) 0.506     (1, 20) -1.089     (1, 20) 0.131     
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Table 5     Restructuring 
 
  Joint venture/Strategic alliances Company reorganisation Investment banker appointment 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 0.05% 0.271   0.05% 0.05% 0.203   0.05% -0.08% -0.217   -0.08% 
-4 -0.04% -0.219   0.01% 0.07% 0.284   0.11% -0.07% -0.191   -0.15% 
-3 0.06% 0.338   0.07% 0.04% 0.179   0.15% -0.57% -1.583   -0.71% 
-2 0.00% 0.008   0.07% 0.06% 0.254   0.21% -0.38% -1.063   -1.09% 
-1 0.20% 1.089   0.27% 0.29% 1.264   0.51% 0.28% 0.786   -0.81% 
0 0.23% 1.760    0.00% 0.020     0.71% 2.765 **   
1 -0.20% -1.072   -0.20% 0.29% 1.247   0.29% -0.66% -1.844  -0.66% 
2 0.17% 0.905   -0.03% -0.10% -0.444   0.19% 0.23% 0.648   -0.42% 
3 -0.28% -1.501   -0.31% -0.21% -0.925   -0.03% -0.52% -1.457   -0.95% 
4 0.19% 1.038   -0.12% -0.07% -0.294   -0.09% -0.21% -0.599   -1.16% 
5 -0.24% -1.296   -0.36% 0.30% 1.309   0.21% 0.22% 0.628   -0.94% 
10 -0.04% -0.241   -0.64% 0.47% 2.039 * 0.99% 0.20% 0.565   -0.79% 
11 0.42% 2.259 * -0.22% 0.30% 1.305   1.29% -0.50% -1.399   -1.29% 
20 -0.09% -0.477   -0.08% -0.06% -0.272   0.69% -1.00% -2.755 ** -0.79% 
                          
  ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     
  (-1, -5) 0.640    (-1, -5) 0.945    (-1, -5) -0.978    
  (1, 20) -0.080     (1, 20) 0.564     (1, 20) -0.425     
             
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 

















Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 







  Internal External 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 0.07% 0.531   0.07% -0.10% -0.426   -0.10% 
-4 -0.12% -0.887   -0.05% -0.07% -0.306   -0.17% 
-3 0.19% 1.443   0.14% 0.15% 0.635   -0.02% 
-2 -0.01% -0.075   0.13% 0.05% 0.195   0.02% 
-1 0.15% 1.123   0.28% -0.13% -0.562   -0.11% 
0 0.41% 4.429 **   0.21% 1.243     
1 0.10% 0.774   0.10% -0.33% -1.384   -0.33% 
2 -0.04% -0.321   0.06% 0.27% 1.131   -0.06% 
3 0.11% 0.814   0.17% -0.31% -1.312   -0.37% 
4 0.05% 0.380   0.21% -0.06% -0.246   -0.43% 
5 -0.02% -0.145   0.20% -0.34% -1.458   -0.77% 
10 0.26% 1.985 * 0.29% -0.14% -0.607   -1.74% 
                  
  ACAR T-Stat    ACAR T-Stat    
  (-1, -5) 0.919     (-1, -5) -0.198     
  (1, 20) 0.065     (1, 20) -1.181     
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Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 




Table 7     Analyst recommendations 
 
  Positive recommendation Negative recommendation Neutral recommendation 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 -0.16% -1.439  -0.16% -0.07% -0.471  -0.07% -0.67% -1.751  -0.67% 
-4 -0.04% -0.366  -0.20% -0.11% -0.728  -0.19% 0.03% 0.070  -0.64% 
-3 -0.23% -1.987 * -0.43% -0.15% -0.984  -0.34% -0.01% -0.032  -0.65% 
-2 0.02% 0.168  -0.41% -0.50% -3.217 ** -0.84% -0.08% -0.202  -0.73% 
-1 0.35% 3.068 ** -0.06% -0.74% -4.760 ** -1.59% -0.03% -0.071  -0.76% 
0 0.93% 11.424 **   -0.52% -4.700 **   -0.28% -1.028    
1 0.10% 0.925  0.10% -0.37% -2.341 ** -0.37% -0.43% -1.128  -0.43% 
2 -0.03% -0.291  0.07% -0.24% -1.528  -0.60% 0.11% 0.294  -0.32% 
3 -0.11% -1.003  -0.04% -0.02% -0.116  -0.62% -0.28% -0.737  -0.60% 
4 0.18% 1.582  0.14% -0.13% -0.814  -0.75% -0.26% -0.679  -0.86% 
5 -0.01% -0.105  0.13% 0.01% 0.054  -0.74% 0.45% 1.181  -0.41% 
                          
  ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     
  (-1, -5) -0.239    (-1, -5) -4.377 **   (-1, -5) -0.856    
  (1, 20) 0.414     (1, 20) -1.854    (1, 20) 1.488     
42 
















Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 
italicized bold. Returns which are significant only at the 10% level are simply shown in italicized bold type 
alone. 
 
  Internal External 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 0.10% 0.671  0.10% 0.10% 0.589  0.10% 
-4 0.06% 0.403  0.16% 0.16% 0.949  0.26% 
-3 0.18% 1.198  0.34% 0.03% 0.169  0.29% 
-2 0.17% 1.122  0.51% -0.07% -0.394  0.22% 
-1 0.26% 1.756  0.77% 0.20% 1.171  0.42% 
0 0.49% 4.559 **   0.29% 2.406 **   
1 -0.10% -0.677  -0.10% -0.18% -1.094  -0.18% 
2 0.03% 0.177  -0.08% -0.22% -1.323  -0.41% 
3 0.37% 2.470 ** 0.30% 0.41% 2.405 ** 0.00% 
4 -0.16% -1.052  0.14% 0.04% 0.258  0.04% 
5 -0.01% -0.050  0.13% -0.17% -1.013  -0.13% 
10 0.31% 2.030 * 0.26% -0.01% -0.049  -0.44% 
                  
  ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     
  (-1, -5) 2.219 *   (-1, -5) 1.071    
  (1, 20) 0.151     (1, 20) -0.815     
43 
Table 9     New product or customer 
 
  New product (service) New customer (contract) 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 0.30% 1.353  0.30% -0.29% -2.043 * -0.29% 
-4 -0.16% -0.700  0.15% -0.08% -0.598  -0.37% 
-3 0.07% 0.299  0.21% -0.36% -2.538 ** -0.73% 
-2 0.40% 1.774  0.61% 0.16% 1.132  -0.57% 
-1 0.22% 0.976  0.83% 0.34% 2.399 ** -0.23% 
0 0.76% 4.747 **   0.86% 8.595 **   
1 0.08% 0.375  0.08% 0.13% 0.930  0.13% 
2 -0.10% -0.455  -0.02% 0.07% 0.470  0.20% 
3 -0.34% -1.504  -0.35% 0.07% 0.503  0.27% 
4 0.17% 0.740  -0.19% -0.15% -1.089  0.11% 
5 -0.25% -1.097  -0.43% 0.06% 0.419  0.17% 
17 0.45% 2.004 * 1.28% 0.13% 0.925  -0.09% 
                  
  ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     
  (-1, -5) 1.597    (-1, -5) -0.714    
  (1, 20) 0.918     (1, 20) -0.263     
 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 





Table 10     Dividend announcement 
 
  Regular dividend Special dividend 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 -0.40% -1.296  -0.40% -0.59% -1.018  -0.59% 
-4 -0.21% -0.661  -0.60% 0.33% 0.576  -0.25% 
-3 0.17% 0.549  -0.43% 0.39% 0.677  0.14% 
-2 -0.18% -0.592  -0.61% 0.18% 0.311  0.32% 
-1 0.31% 1.016  -0.30% 0.59% 1.015  0.90% 
0 0.02% 0.112    0.12% 0.289    
1 0.32% 1.032  0.32% -0.06% -0.101  -0.06% 
2 0.07% 0.247  0.39% -0.20% -0.352  -0.26% 
3 -0.43% -1.420  -0.04% -0.75% -1.310  -1.01% 
4 0.59% 1.936  0.55% 0.16% 0.272  -0.86% 
5 0.12% 0.380  0.66% 0.23% 0.407  -0.62% 
                  
  ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     
  (-1, -5) -0.426    (-1, -5) 0.674    
  (1, 20) 1.401     (1, 20) -1.179     
 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 








Table 11     Share issues and repurchases 
 
  Share issues Share repurchases 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 -0.01% -0.167  -0.01% 0.12% 0.929  0.12% 
-4 0.06% 0.784  0.04% 0.24% 1.944  0.36% 
-3 -0.09% -1.288  -0.05% -0.11% -0.853  0.25% 
-2 0.01% 0.142  -0.04% -0.21% -1.732  0.03% 
-1 -0.06% -0.882  -0.10% -0.26% -2.096 * -0.22% 
0 -0.02% -0.436    0.12% 1.307    
1 0.00% -0.031  0.00% 0.17% 1.365  0.17% 
2 -0.20% -2.850 ** -0.20% 0.29% 2.307 * 0.46% 
3 0.08% 1.156  -0.12% 0.18% 1.430  0.63% 
4 0.01% 0.096  -0.11% 0.17% 1.398  0.81% 
5 0.02% 0.231  -0.10% 0.11% 0.887  0.92% 
7 -0.17% -2.464 ** -0.25% 0.09% 0.738  1.05% 
9 -0.15% -2.167 * -0.44% 0.14% 1.123  1.29% 
16 -0.11% -1.538  -0.67% 0.35% 2.857 ** 1.87% 
                  
  ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     
  (-1, -5) -0.608    (-1, -5) -0.782    
  (1, 20) -1.980 *   (1, 20) 2.455 **   
 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AAR is the Average Abnormal Return, 
and ACAR is the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. Averaging was carried out across event firms. The 
event window extends from five days before the event to 20 days following the news announcement. The 
event day consists of two trading days. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AAR is 
zero is indicated by ** and * for the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively which are also shown in 
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Table 12     Miscellaneous news 
 
  Miscellaneous good news Miscellaneous bad news Ambiguous news 
Day AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR AAR T-Stat   ACAR 
-5 0.17% 0.824  0.17% 0.17% 1.116  0.17% 0.04% 0.167  0.04% 
-4 -0.10% -0.488  0.07% -0.15% -0.967  0.02% -0.11% -0.506  -0.07% 
-3 0.10% 0.482  0.17% -0.02% -0.161  0.00% -0.07% -0.300  -0.14% 
-2 0.45% 2.251 * 0.62% 0.03% 0.217  0.03% -0.19% -0.848  -0.33% 
-1 0.50% 2.498 ** 1.12% -0.08% -0.510  -0.05% 0.12% 0.550  -0.21% 
0 1.41% 9.789 **  -0.57% -5.199 **  0.26% 1.631   
1 0.02% 0.112  0.02% -0.14% -0.893  -0.14% -0.21% -0.927  -0.21% 
2 -0.06% -0.282  -0.03% 0.11% 0.730  -0.02% -0.20% -0.911  -0.41% 
3 -0.11% -0.534  -0.14% -0.09% -0.569  -0.11% -0.05% -0.237  -0.46% 
4 -0.20% -0.978  -0.34% 0.04% 0.240  -0.08% 0.18% 0.830  -0.28% 
5 -0.17% -0.832  -0.51% 0.00% 0.024  -0.07% -0.10% -0.447  -0.37% 
13 0.01% 0.052  -0.87% -0.23% -1.467  -0.69% -0.47% -2.104 * -0.87% 
                          
  ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     ACAR T-Stat     
  (-1, -5) 2.399 **   (-1, -5) -0.131    (-1, -5) -0.404    
  (1, 20) -0.981     (1, 20) -0.905     (1, 20) -1.757    
